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U.s. Laws in the Rainforest: Can a U.s. 
Court Find Liability for Extraterritorial 
Pollution Caused by a U.S. Corporation? 
An Analysis of Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc. 
INTRODUCTION 
Before 1972, the members of the United Nations passed few 
international environmental agreements. In 1972, several members 
of the United Nations met in Stockholm to discuss issues relating to 
the environment and signed a declaration committing the United 
Nations to environmental concerns.! The international community 
has subsequently enacted numerous multilateral and bilateral con-
ventions that deal with environmental issues.2 
These environmental conventions are not binding on states that 
do not ratify them, on private parties, or on multinational corpora-
tions (multinationals).3 The United Nations has recommended a 
code of conduct for multinationals to address this problem.4 The 
code specifically includes provisions that relate to the environment.s 
Corporations that cause environmental damage are often not 
held liable for their actions. Even where environmental regulations 
exist, enforcement of penalties for transnational environmental vio-
lations is problematic because courts are uncertain whether they 
have jurisdiction.6 In the United States, the application of the doc-
I Report oj the u.N. ConJerence on the Human Environment, Stockholm Declaration of the 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 27th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 48/14 
(1972). 
2 From 1972 to 1979, at least 35 such treaties were signed. In the 1980s, at least 48 were 
signed. See Edith Brown Weiss, ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 482-90 
app. B (Edith Brown Weiss ed., United Nations University Press 1992) [hereinafter ENVIRON-
MENTAL CHANGE]. 
3 See BURNS H. WESTON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 11 (1990). 
Throughout this Note, the term "multinational corporation" is used synonymously with 
"transnational corporation," and designates corporations with a main corporate entity in one 
country, and branches, subsidiaries, and partnerships within other sovereigns. 
4 See generally Commission on Transnational Corporations: Report on the SPecial Session, U.N. 
ESCOR, 38th Sess., Supp. No.7, U.N. Doc. E/1983/17/Rev.l (1983) [hereinafter Draft Code]. 
This code is in no way binding and has not been adopted by the U.N. General Assembly. 
sId. § 43-45. 
6 For example, in Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., after a British court denied jurisdiction 
to order the removal of toxins because they originated in the United States, the U.S. district 
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trine of forum non conveniens virtually guarantees that U.S. multina-
tionals receive little or no penalty for damages inflicted when some-
thing goes awry overseas.7 
On November 3, 1993, Ecuadoran nationals filed a class action 
suit (Aguinda Complaint) in the Southern District of New York, alleg-
ing that Texaco, Inc., caused extensive environmental damage in 
Ecuador.s There may be no remedy available to the plaintiffs in Ecua-
dor: the Ecuadoran Constitution guarantees the right to a clean envi-
ronment, but class actions are not allowed and there is no meaningful 
discovery in Ecuadoran courts.9 There may also be no remedy for the 
Ecuadorans--or any foreign victim of a toxic tort-in the U.S. courts. 
This Note will analyze whether there is currently any remedy 
available in U.S. courts to foreign nationals who sue U.S. multina-
tionals for environmental damage within a foreign sovereign. Part I 
explains the allegations set forth in the Aguinda Complaint. Part II 
explains the theory of extraterritorial jurisdiction, focusing on how 
U.S. courts apply the doctrine in various contexts. Part III discusses 
U.S. environmental statutes that might apply to acts like those al-
leged in the Aguinda Complaint, had they occurred within the 
United States. Part III also discusses the Alien Tort Claims Act 
(ATCA) , one of the theories under which the Aguinda plaintiffs 
brought suit in U.S. courts. Part IV analyzes whether a cause of 
action will stand under these theories of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
This Note concludes that there is a remedy available to aliens situ-
ated similarly to the Aguinda plaintiffs, if the actions alleged are 
violations of international law. 
I. THE COMPLAINT: ACUINDA v. TEXACO, INC. 
Texaco obtained a concession agreement from Ecuador to drill 
oil in 1964.10 Texaco, as minority partner in Petroecuador, drilled 
oil from 1972 to 1992Y The Aguinda Complaint alleges that during 
court also denied jurisdiction because the toxin was located in Great Britain. 775 F. Supp. 668, 
670, 672 (S.D.N.Y 1991). 
7 See, e.g., In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in December, 1984, 
809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 871 (1987). 
8 Aguinda v. Texaco Inc., No. 93 Civ. 7257 (S.D.N.Y Nov. 3, 1993) [hereinafter Aguinda 
Complaint]. 
9 ECUADOR CONST. art. 19, 2; DECREE No. 374: Act for the Prevention and Control of 
Environmental Pollution, 97 R.O. 6 (1976), translated in FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL LEGIS-
LATION VOL. XXVI #1, 120-133 (Food & Agricultural Organization of the U.N., Rome, Italy 
1977). 
10 Aquinda Complaint, supra note 8, at 4. 
II Ecuadorian Indians Sue Texaco for Damage to Rivers, Land in Amazon Basin, INT'L ENVTL. 
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that time Texaco improperly handled wastes, several oil spills oc-
curred, and pipelines burst, all of which resulted in extensive envi-
ronmental damage. 12 
The ground water in the area is now polluted with toxins that are 
known cancer causing agents. 13 The native peoples' children are 
covered in growths and the local water is not fit for bathing or 
consumption. 14 Collected rainwater is their only water supply-and 
the rainwater itself was tested and found to contain toxins. IS 
Texaco no longer participates in the oil drilling operations in Ecua-
dor; all contractual relationships ended in June 1992.16 The local people 
are left with a hazardous environment and potentially no remedy. The 
plaintiffs seek damages under a variety of common law tort theoriesP 
They seek both compensatory and punitive damages from Texaco. ls 
II. EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION 
A. Definitions and Problems: Doctrines of Extraterritorial jurisdiction 
Extraterritorial jurisdiction 19 is a form of jurisdiction under which 
one sovereign claims the right to regulate activities outside its sov-
ereign borders.20 This may create conflicts because the sovereign in 
which the activity occurs may also claim jurisdiction. The Restatement 
(Third) of Foreign Relations (Restatement (Third)), recognizes extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction under a number of principles. 21 These include: 
the territorial principle, the effects principle, the nationality princi-
ple, the passive personality principle, and the protective principle.22 
DAILY (BNA) , Nov. 5, 1993, available in LEXIS, IntIaw Library, Intenv File [hereinafter Indians 
Sue]. Texaco, holding a 37.5% share in Petroecuador, ran the oil drilling operations until 
June 1990. Id; see also Aguinda Complaint, supra note 8, at 4. 
12 Aguinda Complaint, supra note 8, at 4-5. 
13Id. at 5. 
14Id. at 5, 6--18. 
15Id. at 12. 
16 See Indians Sue, supra note 11. 
17 Aguinda Complaint, supra note 8, at 5. 
18Id. at 37. 
19 Extraterritorial jurisdiction is often called jurisdiction to prescribe and is sometimes 
discussed under the rubric of a general conflict of laws analysis. The question of extraterrito-
rial or prescriptive jurisdiction is different from, but includes, a traditional conflict of laws 
analysis. See ALAN C. SWAN & JOHN F. MURPHY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE REGULATIONS 
OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 515-83 (1991). 
20Id. at 515. 
21 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, § 402 cmts. c-g. [hereinafter RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD)]. 
22Id. 
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International law most commonly recognizes the territorial and 
nationality principles as justifications for extraterritorial jurisdiction.23 
Most assertions of jurisdiction are based on the territorial princi-
ple-jurisdiction over actions and actors located within the territory 
of the sovereign at the time the disputed activities occurred.24 In the 
United States, the territorial principle has an expanded definition 
under the effects doctrine, which extends jurisdiction over activities 
that have effects within the borders of the sovereign.25 Under the 
effects doctrine, the United States may assert jurisdiction even if no 
acts occurred within its borders. 
The nationality principle is based on the nationality of the person 
who committed the acts in question.26 "International law has increas-
ingly recognized the right of a state to exercise jurisdiction on the 
basis of domicile or residence, rather than nationality .... "27 The 
nationality principle applies to corporations, other business entities, 
and natural persons.28 
In addition to extraterritorial jurisdiction based on territory and 
nationality, U.S. courts may assert jurisdiction under the protective 
principle (based on interests of national security), or the passive 
personality principle (based on the nationality of the victim) .29 The 
protective principle is invoked when an activity that occurred out-
side the sovereign somehow threatens or endangers the viability of 
the sovereign.30 The protective principle is very narrow and only 
includes actions directed at state security, such as espionage,31 I.R.S. 
issues,32 and the falsification of official documents.33 The passive 
personality principle allows a court to assert jurisdiction over defen-
dants when the victim is a national of the country that asserts such 
jurisdiction.34 This latter principle is most often used in criminallaw.35 
23Id. at cmt. a. 
24Id. at cmt. c. 
25Id. at cmt. d. 
26 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 21, § 402 (e). 
27Id. § 402 cmt. e. 
28Id. 
29Id. at cmts. f, g. 
30 See id. at cmt. f. 
31 See generally United States v. Zehe, 601 F. Supp. 196 (D. Mass 1985). 
32 See generally In re Marc Rich & Co., A.G., 707 F.2d 663 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 
1215 (1961). 
33 See generally United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936 
(1968); Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545 (9th Cir.) , cert. denied, 366 U.S. 948 (1961). 
34REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 21, § 402 cmt. g. 
35Id. 
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The Restatement (Third) also recognizes jurisdiction over so-called 
"universal crimes. ''36 Also called jus cog ens, these are activities 
defined by the international community as so offensive that they are 
crimes in any state, and any sovereign may assert jurisdiction over 
the offender.37 Any treaty made in violation of jus cog ens is void ab 
initio as a violation of international law.38 The types of crimes the 
international community considers violations of jus cogens include 
piracy, genocide, and torture. 39 
Within the United States, extraterritorial jurisdiction may be ex-
ercised by legislative enactment, executive order, or judicial proceed-
ings; the latter two must be pursuant to a statute.40 Its exercise is not 
without limits: issues of comity and conflict of laws require states to 
limit their exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction.4l If one sovereign 
has a significant interest in the activity, it may protest that its sover-
eign rights are being violated if extraterritorial jurisdiction is exer-
cised.42 U.S. courts assume that Congress does not intend conflicting 
jurisdiction, and thus will interpret legislation so that it will not 
conflict with international law or the law of other sovereign nations.43 
When the party over whom the sovereign wishes to assert extra-
territorial jurisdiction is a juridical person, the issue of jurisdiction 
may be more complex.44 A juridical person is an entity that has 
certain legal rights or responsibilities such as a corporation, subsidi-
ary, or partnership.45 "[A] state may exercise jurisdiction to prescribe 
36 !d. § 404. Section 404 states: 
Id. 
[a] state has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for certain offenses 
recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern, such as piracy, slave 
trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain 
acts of terrorism, even where none of the bases of jurisdiction indicated in § 402 is 
present. 
37 See WESTON ET AL., supra note 3, at 127-28 (citing J. STARK, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
INTERNATIONAL LAw 53-54 (9th ed. 1984). 
38 See id. at 127 (quoting J. STARK, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 53-54 (9th 
ed. 1984». 
39 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 21, § 404. 
40 See id. § 402 cmt. i. 
41 See id. § 403. For a discussion of comity, see generally ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNA-
TIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 50-68 (1993); see also infra notes 134-158 and accom-
panying text. 
42 For an example of such a conflict, see generally The Case of the S.S. "Lotus" (France v. 
Turkey), 1927 P.C.!]. (ser. A), No. 10 (Oct. 12). 
43 See, e.g., United States v. Harvey, 2 F.3d 1318, 1327 (3d Cir. 1993). 
44 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 21, § 414. 
45 Compare the definition of natural person in BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1142 (6th ed. 1990). 
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for limited purposes with respect to activities of foreign branches of 
corporations organized under its laws. "46 
A corporation often organizes its activities in a series of subsidiar-
ies and branches in order to minimize its liability. The Restatement 
(Third) states that a sovereign may not "ordinarily regulate activities 
of corporations organized under the laws of a foreign state on the 
basis that they are owned or controlled by nationals of the regulating 
state."47 The Restatement (Third) does specifY exceptions to that limi-
tation,48 including the application of certain accounting and disclo-
sure laws for the sake of uniformity.49 
B. Application of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction by the United States 
The United States exercises extraterritorial jurisdiction in a number 
of ways. The legislative branch may pass laws that implicitly or explicitly 
extend beyond the boundaries of the United States.50 For example, 
customs regulations impose duties that necessarily have an extraterrito-
rial effect because they create competitive barriers to foreign companies. 
Another example is the Export Administration Act of 1979.51 This 
Act authorizes controls over goods or technology "subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States or exported by any person subject 
to the jurisdiction of the United States" in certain circumstances 
involving "national security. "52 This type of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
is generally considered acceptable by the international community. 53 
The executive branch may issue decrees that have an extraterri-
torial impact if it has authorization from Congress to do SO.54 For 
example, the Reagan administration imposed economic sanctions 
against the Soviet and Polish governments in the early 1980s.55 
46REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 21, § 414(1). 
47Id. § 414(2). 
48Id. 
49Id. § 414(2)(a). THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) also recognizes jurisdiction in various 
situations when the state requires compliance with a regulatory scheme. Id. § 414(2) (b). This 
section lists relevant factors for consideration by a state which intends to so assert jurisdiction. 
Id. For a discussion and critique of the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws over foreign 
subsidiaries, see generally Robert B. Thompson, United States jurisdiction Over Foreign Subsidi-
aries: Corporate and International Law Aspects, 15 LAW & POL'y INT'L Bus. 319 (1983). 
50 For example, the Internal Revenue Code, Subchapter N, Part 1 lists the laws relevant to 
foreign income. I.R.C. § 861 et seq. (1993). 
51 50 U.S.C.A. § 2401-2420 (West 1993). 
52Id. § 2404(a) (1). 
53 For example, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is a multilateral 
agreement which provides for international cooperation in the setting of tariff schedules in 
order to facilitate international trade. 
54 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 21, at § 402 cmt. i. 
5547 Fed. Reg. 141-45 Gan. 5, 1982), amending 15 C.F.R. pts. 379, 385, 390, 399 (1981) 
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Under the apparent authority of the Export Administration Act, the 
Reagan administration prohibited the sale of oil, gas, and certain 
equipment and technology to the Soviet Union and Poland.56 The 
administration attempted to block both U.S. companies and their 
European subsidiaries from supplying technology and equipment to 
complete the Euro-Siberian pipeline.57 The administration extended 
its authority over these foreign companies under the auspices of 
existing jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries and technology li-
censed in the United States and exported abroad.58 
These actions were condemned by the international community 
as violations of international law. Both the European Community and 
several individual European governments expressed their position that 
the export controls were invalid.59 One company, Dresser (France), 
was forced to comply with either French law (by shipping goods) or 
U.S. law and chose to comply with the laws of France, the country 
in which it was incorporated.5O This brought subsequent sanctions 
from the United States.61 Ultimately there was such an international 
outcry that the United States repealed its regulations.62 
The judiciary also exercises extraterritorial jurisdiction.63 Like the 
executive branch, the judiciary needs a legislative mandate to exercise 
such jurisdiction.64 The courts have developed a series of tests to deter-
mine whether an exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction is valid, and 
have exercised extraterritorial jurisdiction under a variety of statu-
tory schemes, including the criminal code,65 the Sherman Act,66 and 
the Securities Exchange Act.67 
(amended June 22, 1982, repealed Nov. 17, 1982); see also Kenneth W. Dam, Extraterritoriality 
and Conflicts of Jurisdiction, Address to ASIL (Apr. 15, 1993), in 83 DEP'T ST. BULL., June 
1983, at 48, 50. 
56 47 Fed. Reg. 141-45 (Jan. 5, 1982) (amending 15 C.F.R. pts. 379, 385, 390, 399 (1981) 
(amended June 22,1982, repealed Nov. 17, 1982». 
57 47 Fed. Reg. 27, 250-252 (June 24,1982) (amending 15 C.F.R. pts. 376, 379, 385 (repealed 
Nov. 16, 1982». 
58 See id. 
59 See Patrizio Merciai, The Euro-Siberian Gas Pipeline Dispute-A Compelling Case for the 
Adoption of Jurisdictional Codes of Conduct, 8 MD.]. INT'L L. & TRADE 1, 13-14 (1984). 
60 See id. at 15. 
61 47 Fed. Reg. 39, 708 (Sept. 9, 1982). 
62 Merciai, supra note 59, at 16-18. 
6~ See generally LOWENFELD, supra note 41, at 47-146. 
64 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), § 402 cmt. i. 
65 See generally United States v. Harvey, 2 F.3d at 1318 (1993); United States v. Felix-Gutierrez, 
940 F.2d 1200 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2332 (1993); Rivard V. United States, 375 
F.2d 882 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 389 U.S. 884 (1967). 
6615 U.S.CA § 1,2 (West 1993). 
67 15 U.S.CA § 78(a) et seq. (West 1981). 
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C. It'hen Will the United States Judiciary Exercise Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction? 
When corporations engage in actIvItIes abroad, jurisdictional is-
sues are complex and problematic for the courts. Jurisdictional 
conflicts have become more frequent because a growing number of 
corporations engage in multinational transactions and transporta-
tion and telecommunications have advanced. Regional trade agree-
ments such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) , 
creating an economic union in North America; the Maastricht 
Treaty, creating the European Union, an economic community, in 
Europe; and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) , 
creating an economic association in South East Asia, indicate the 
diminishing significance of national boundaries in a business con-
text. The elimination of economic borders will lead to more difficult 
jurisdictional problems in the future. 
1. Forum Non Conveniens 
The doctrine of forum non convenienf'8 is a common law doctrine 
based on the convenience of both parties.59 If a court otherwise has 
jurisdiction, it may nonetheless dismiss a case if it finds that it can 
be litigated more efficiently in another forum.70 The court may 
68 The doctrine of forum non conveniens was brought from admiralty law into federal 
common law in the companion cases of Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1946) and 
Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1946). Subsequent cases 
cite Justice Jackson's decisions because he clearly explicated the tests to be applied. See 
generally Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981), reh'g denied, 455 U.S. 928 (1982); 
In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in December, 1984, 809 F.2d 
195 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 871 (1987). 
Some states have abolished the doctrine. For example, the Texas legislature passed a statute 
which abolished the doctrine of forum non conveniens in wrongful death and personal injury 
actions arising out of an incident in a foreign state or country. See TEX. CODE ANN. § 71.031; 
see also Dow Chern. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 674 (Tex. 1990). The Fifth Circuit 
has not determined whether the federal or state law on forum non conveniens wiJJ apply in a 
conflict of laws analysis. Similarly, a line of cases in the Florida courts have restricted the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens to cases in which neither party to an action is a resident of 
Florida. See Sempe v. Coordinated Caribbean Transport, Inc., 363 So.2d 194, 196 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1978). The Eleventh Circuit determined that the doctrine of forum non conveniens 
applies at the federal level, rather than at the state level, in a conflict of laws analysis. See 
Sibaja v. Dow Chern. Co., 757 F.2d 1215 (11th Cir. 1985). 
69 E.g., Reyno, 454 U.S. at 249; Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508; Maganlal & Co. v. M.G. Chern. Co., 
942 F.2d 164, 167 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 179 (1993); Overseas Programming 
Cos., Ltd. v. Cinematographische CommerzanstaIt, 684 F.2d 232, 234 (2d Cir. 1982). 
70 E.g., Reyno, 454 U.S. at 241; Koster, 330 U.S. at 524. 
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dismiss a case on the basis of forum non conveniens if the defendant 
consents to jurisdiction in the alternative forum. 71 A court will not, 
however, dismiss the case if the plaintiff has no effective remedy in 
the alternative jurisdiction.72 
A court first determines if another adequate forum exists. 73 If such 
a forum does exist, the court will engage in a balancing test: the 
court will weigh the plaintiffs choice of forum, private factors, and 
public factors to determine whether litigating the case in the plain-
tiffs chosen forum will be "oppressive."74 If the court finds that the 
balance favors dismissal, the court may conditionally dismiss, and 
the plaintiff may file in an alternative forum. 75 
2. The Sherman Act and Antitrust Laws: Development of the 
Approach to Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
The Court first addressed the extraterritorial reach of U.S. laws 
and, specifically, the Sherman Act, in American Banana Co. v. United 
Fruit CO.76 In that case,Justice Holmes declined jurisdiction to review 
the legality of the seizure of a U.S. owned plantation located on the 
border of Panama and Costa Rica. 77 The plaintiff claimed that its 
71 See, e.g., Union Carmde, 809 F.2d at 202. The court in Union Carmde held that India was 
an adequate forum because the corporation consented to jurisdiction. Id.; see also Reyno, 454 
U.S. at 254, n.22; Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 506-07. 
72 Reyno, 454 U.S. at 254. "[I]f the remedy provided by the alternative forum is so clearly 
inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all, the unfavorable change in law may be 
given substantial weight; the district court may conclude that dismissal would not be in the 
interests of justice." Id. 
73 Reyno, 454 U.S. at 254, n.22; Union Carmde, 809 F.2d at 202; accord Borden, Inc. v. Meiji 
Milk Prods. Co., Ltd., 919 F.2d 822, 828 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 2259 (1991). 
The court in Meiji Milk Products held that courts must determine whether an alternative 
forum exists, but that the analysis is not fatal if this is not done first. 919 F.2d at 828. 
74 E.g., Reyno, 454 U.S. at 241; Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508; Blanco v. Banco Industrial de 
Venezuela, 997 F.2d 974, 980 (2d Cir. 1993); Schertenleib v. Traum, 589 F.2d 1156, 1160 (2d 
Cir. 1978). There are several private interest factors the courts analyze, including: (a) relative 
ease of access to sources of proof; (b) availability of compulsory process for attendance of 
unwilling witnesses; (c) cost of obtaining attendance of willing witnesses; (d) practical prob-
lems making trial of case easy, expeditious and inexpensive; (e) questions as to the enforce-
ability of a judgment if one is obtained. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508. Public interest factors include: 
(a) administrative difficulties; (b) burden of jury duty to community which has no relation 
to litigation; (c) local interest in having localized controversies decided at home; (d) having 
trial in a forum which is familiar with the law that must govern the case. Id. at 508-09; see 
also Blanco, 997 F.2d at 980. 
75 Union Carmde, 809 F.2d at 203-204; Schertenleib, 589 F.2d at 1166. In Schertenleib, the court 
upheld a dismissal on the condition that the defendant submit to jurisdiction and that the 
alternative forum accept the case. 589 F.2d at 1166. 
76 213 U.S. 347 (1909). 
77 Id. at 359. 
230 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW [Vol. XVIII, No.1 
competitor had persuaded the Costa Rican government to seize its 
property in violation of the Sherman Act, but the Court held that 
"the general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act 
as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the 
country where the act is done."78 
In 1945, the Second Circuit held that the Sherman Act applied 
extraterritorially in United States v. Aluminum Corporation oj America 
(ALCOA).79 Judge Learned Hand articulated a two-part test for de-
termining whether to give extraterritorial effect to an act of Con-
gress: (1) determine whether Congress intended the statute to have 
an extraterritorial effect; (2) determine whether the actions were 
intended to and did, in fact, have an effect within the United 
States.80 
Courts currently analyze antitrust cases by a three-part test first 
articulated by the Ninth Circuit in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank oj 
America, N. T & S.A.81 Timberlane involved an alleged conspiracy to 
prevent the subsidiaries of Timberlane from milling lumber in Hon-
duras.82 The court held that the Sherman Act applied outside the 
United States, albeit in a somewhat more limited capacity than it 
applied within the United States.83 The court stated that for the law 
to apply extraterritorially there must be some effect, either actual 
or intended, on U.S. foreign commerce.84 The court rejected a 
"substantial effects" test in favor of a three-part test: (1) was there 
an effect, or an intended effect, on U.S. foreign commerce; (2) was 
the effect a cognizable violation of the Sherman Act; and (3) is the 
assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction reasonable or prudent with 
respect to potential conflicts with the laws of the foreign sovereign.85 
78Id. at 356. 
79 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). ALCOA, a Delaware Corporation, created Aluminum Lim-
ited, a Canadian corporation. Id. at 439. The Canadian corporation then entered into a cartel 
with British, French, German, and Swiss companies to limit aluminum production. Id. at 442. 
80 See id. at 443-44. 
81 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). 
82Id. at 601. Timberlane alleged that the Bank of America, acting through various contacts 
in Honduras, disrupted the operations of Timberlane's Honduran subsidiary, Maya. Id. at 
604-5. The Bank of America's Honduran affiliates foreclosed on a lien, disregarding Timber-
lane's repeated offers to pay the amount due, and employed guards and troops to shut down 
Timberlane's milling operations. Id. 
83 See id. at 608-609. 
84Id. at 613. 
85Id. at 615. 
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3. Extraterritorial Application of Other U.S. Laws and the 
Three-Part Test 
a. Intent 
231 
To determine whether a law applies extraterritorially, courts first 
determine whether there is congressional intent for the law to so 
apply.86 There is a presumption against such an intent.87 There is 
also a narrow category of congressional statutes, at least within the 
Third Circuit, which apply extraterritorially with no explicit congres-
sional intent.88 The Eighth Circuit has also held that an individual 
who willfully conspires to commit a crime is under the jurisdiction 
of the sovereign in which the effect is felt, regardless of where the 
acts of conspiracy took place.89 
In a recent criminal case, the Third Circuit found congressional 
intent without an express congressional mandate.90 United States v. 
Harvey involved the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploi-
tation Act.91 The court held that when a U.S. citizen is the defendant, 
and the statutory scheme is broad, extraterritorial intent will be 
found if denying extraterritorial application will largely eviscerate 
the statute.92 
The court found that Congress intended the Act to greatly en-
hance the means with which to fight child pornography and child 
prostitution.93 The court also found evidence in the congressional 
record that Congress intended the statute to address child pornog-
raphy issues in areas never before within the purview of federal 
investigators.94 The court noted that Congress specifically mandated 
the United States Customs Service to give a high priority to the 
interception of this pornographic material.95 Citing United States v. 
Bowman,96 the court declared that failure to apply the statute to 
86 ALCOA, 148 F.2d at 443. 
87 Harvey, 2 F.3d at 1327; see also Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949). 
88 See Harvey, 2 F.3d at 1327 (citing Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549, 
2559 (1993)). 
89 See Rivard, 375 F.2d at 887. 
90 Harvey, 2 F.3d at 1327 (1993). 
91Id. at 1320. The Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act is codified at 18 
U.S.CA §§ 2251-58 (West 1993). 
92 See 2 F.3d at 1327. 
93Id. (citing S. Rep. No. 95-438, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10). 
94 2 F.3d at 1327. 
95Id. 
96 260 U.S. 94 (1922). 
232 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XVIII, No. I 
foreign suppliers of child pornography would eviscerate the statute 
and therefore Congress must have intended it to apply extraterrito-
rially.97 
The intent of Congress must be much more explicit in the context 
of labor law. New York Central R.R. v. Chisholm was the first case that 
dealt with the extraterritorial application of U.S. labor laws.98 The 
U.S. Supreme Court followed American Banana and held that a U.S. 
citizen could not recover under the Federal Employers' Liability Act 
(FELA) in U.S. courts for a tort action against a U.S. corporation 
where the activity occurred within a foreign sovereign.99 The injury 
at issue in Chisholm occurred thirty miles inside Canadian territory 
on a passenger train operating between New York and Montreal. lOo 
The Court found "no words which definitely disclose [congres-
sional] intent to give [FELA] extraterritorial effect .... "101 
The U.S. Supreme Court likewise refused to apply the Eight Hour 
Law extraterritorially in Foley Bros. Inc. v. Filardo,102 a case decided 
by the Court four years after ALCOA. The Court held that the Act 
did not apply to a U.S. citizen employed by a U.S. contractor who 
performed work in Iraq and Iran pursuant to a contract with the 
U.S. government. I03 The Court found no intent expressed by Con-
gress for the law to apply extraterritorially, either in the Act itself, 
or in the legislative history.104 The Court declined jurisdiction be-
cause there was no distinction between aliens and citizens in the 
statute. 105 The Court stated that, if they applied the law extraterrito-
rially to cover a U.S. citizen, it would apply to all employees, regard-
less of citizenship, when a company contracted with the United 
States to work outside the United States.106 
97 2 F.3d at 1327. To support its position, the court cited a Ninth Circuit case, United States 
v. Thomas, 893 F.2d 1066 (9th Cir.) , cert. denied, 498 U.S. 826 (1990). In Thomas, the defendant 
was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (a) for employing, persuading, or coercing a minor to 
engage in sexually explicit conduct in order to produce a visual depiction. [d. at 1068. The 
court held that the action applied, even though the acts allegedly took place in Mexico. [d. 
at 1068, 1069. 
98 268 U.S. 29 (1925). 
99 [d. at 31-32. 
100 [d. at 30. 
101 [d. at 31. 
102 336 U.S. 281, 284-85 (1948). 
103 [d. at 283, 285. 
104 See id. The Act applied to "[elvery contract made to which the United States is a party 
.... " [d. at 282. The contract between the contractor and the United States included a clause 
stating that they would "obey and abide by all applicable laws, regulations, ordinances, and 
other rules of the United States of America." [d. at 283. 
105 [d. at 286. 
106 [d. 
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In the most recent Supreme Court decision on the extraterritorial 
application of U.S. labor laws, E.E. 0. C. v. Arabian American Oil Co. 
(Aramco),107 the Court held that Title VII did not apply to U.S. 
citizens working for a U.S. corporation overseas. lOS Chief Justice 
Rehnquist authored the decision which held that there was no 
requisite congressional intent for the law to apply outside the terri-
toriallimits of the United States. lOg The Chief Justice articulated a 
new, higher burden of proof in extraterritorial jurisdiction cases: the 
petitioner must show an affirmative intent by Congress for a statute 
to apply outside the United States to overcome the presumption 
against extraterritorial application of U.S. laws,uo It is significant to 
note that this is the same test explicitly rejected in Timberlane Lum-
ber. lll 
Courts also hesitate to find congressional intent in environmental 
cases. In Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp.,m the District Court in the 
Southern District of New York declined to apply the Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act (RCRA) 113 extraterritorially,u4 The dis-
trict court dismissed the case stating that RCRA generally did not 
apply extraterritorially. 115 The plaintiff argued that the congressional 
record indicated the bill should help safeguard against the ill effects 
of hazardous waste-including those wastes bound for export-and, 
107 499 U.S. 244 (1991). 
108Id. at 246-47. In Aramco, the petitioner, a naturalized U.S. citizen, was working for 
Aramco, a Delaware corporation, in Saudi Arabia when he was discharged, allegedly in 
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 247. Mter filing a charge of 
discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the employee 
instituted a suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. Id. 
109 Id. at 259. 
llO See id. at 249. The Court did not agree with the EEOC that the statute's "alien exemption" 
clause necessarily implied that Congress intended to protect U.S. citizens from employment 
discrimination by U.S. corporations abroad. Id. at 253. It is possible to interpret the alien 
exemption clause as an indication by Congress that it was aware of the Supreme Court's 
decision in Foley Bros. and, thus, intended to allow application of the law extraterritorially to 
U.S. citizens alone by drawing this line. The Court declined to impute from the statute's broad 
jurisdictional language any intention to give it extraterritorial effect. Id. at 251. 
III See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text. 
ll2775 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y 1991). 
ll342 U.S.C.A. § 6901 et seq. (West 1983 & Supp. 1993) [hereinafter RCRA). 
ll4775 F. Supp. at 676. FMC, a Delaware corporation, contracted with Amlon to ship copper 
residue for reclamation to Amlon in Great Britain. Id. at 669. Upon importation into Great 
Britain, a mysterious odor was detected and FMC admitted that contrary to their agreement 
there were toxins in the containers. Id. Amlon sued FMC in British courts for removal. Id. at 
670. The court declined jurisdiction, as the bulk of the activity relevant to the case took place 
in the United States. Id. Mter the British courts determined that U.S. law controlled, Amlon 
filed suit in the United States under, among other things, the Alien Tort Claims Act and RCRA. 
Id. 
ll5Id. at 671, 676. 
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therefore, showed congressional intent for the 1984 RCRA amend-
ments to apply extraterritorially.ll6 The court, however, linked these 
remarks to the waste export provision of the statute, not the citizen 
suit provision, and denied relief under the statute. ll7 
b. Actual or Intended Effects 
If a court finds congressional intent for the law to apply extrater-
ritorially, the court will then examine whether there is an actual or 
intended domestic effect sufficient to apply the statute extraterrito-
rially. In some contexts, minimal or no domestic effects are re-
quired.ns In others, the court requires substantial effects.1l9 Courts 
differ, depending on the context, on the issue of how extensive these 
effects must be to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
As seen above, under the Sherman Act, a court usually requires 
only an actual or intended effect that is a cognizable violation of the 
statute for the court to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction.120 In Con-
servation Council of Western Australia, Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of America 
(Alcoa),121 however, the District Court in the Western District of 
Pennsylvania declined to accept jurisdiction to enjoin mining opera-
tions in Australia absent substantial domestic effects. 122 The court 
found no domestic effects alleged in the complaint and, therefore, 
dismissed the case.123 
In the criminal context, however, a court may assert jurisdiction 
without any domestic effect. The reasoning behind extraterritorial 
jurisdiction is often substantially similar to that applied under the 
Sherman Act, but jurisdiction is also asserted under the nationality 
1I6Id. at 674 (quoting 129 Congo Rec. 27691 (1984». 
117 Id. at 674. 
118 Felix-Gutierrez, 940 F.2d at 1205. 
119 Conservation Council ofW. Austl. Inc. V. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 518 F. Supp. 270 
(W.D. Pa. 1981). 
120 Timberlane Lumber Co., 549 F.2d at 615; see also supra text accompanying notes 81-85. 
121 518 F. Supp. 270 (W.D. Pa. 1981). 
122Id. at 282. In an effort to enjoin the operation, some Australian conservationists filed 
suit in the United States against the parent companies of an Australian mining concern. Id. 
at 271. Stating that the court would not "place a palladium in Western Australia," the court 
declined jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) or 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity 
jurisdiction). See id. at 276, 279, 282. The court also refused to extend jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1337 (jurisdiction arising under congressional act regulating commerce or protecting 
trade or commerce). Alcoa, 518 F. Supp. at 274. The court cited Mannington Mills, Inc. V. 
Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979), for the proposition that there must be 
substantial domestic effects for the Sherman Act to apply. Id. 
123 Alcoa, 518 F. Supp. at 275, 276. 
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principle or the passive personality principle.!24 In criminal cases, 
courts generally infer extraterritorial jurisdiction from the nature of 
the offense itself.!25 
In United States v. Felix-Gutierrez,!26 for example, the defendant was 
charged with the kidnapping, torture, and murder of a Special 
Agent from the Drug Enforcement Agency in violation of 18 U.S.c. 
§ 3.127 The murder victim disappeared in Guatel.yara, Mexico, and 
his body appeared one month later in Zamora, Michoacan, Mex-
ico.128 The court held that U.S. law applied and affirmed a two-part 
test: (1) there must be congressional intent, express or implied, for 
the statute to apply extraterritorially; and (2) the application must 
be reasonable under international law principles.!29 
c. Conflict oj Laws 
Once a court has determined that Congress intended a statute to 
apply extraterritorially, and that there was the requisite domestic 
effect, the court will engage in a conflict of laws analysis.!30 U.S. 
courts, in most cases, will not apply U.S. laws extraterritorially if they 
believe there is a conflict of laws, or if they feel this application will 
violate internationallaw.!3! It is unclear how much conflict must be 
involved before the court will decline jurisdiction. In determining 
whether to accept jurisdiction, a court must weigh several conflicting 
factors including: the concerns of sovereigns potentially affected by 
the situation; whether the law applied extraterritorially will conflict 
with the laws of that sovereign; the goals of the international com-
munity; and, whether the extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction 
conflicts with international law.!32 
Courts do not want to take an action that will impinge on the 
President's ability to conduct foreign affairs by creating friction 
between the United States and foreign nations.133 For this reason, a 
124 See Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545, 549 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 948 (1961); 
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 21, § 402 cmts. e, g. 
125 See Harvey, 2 F.3d at 1327 (quoting United States v. Wright Barker, 784 F.2d 161, 167 (3d 
Cir. 1986)). 
126 940 F.2d 1200. 
127Id. at 1203 & n.1. 
128Id. at 1203. 
129Id. at 1204. 
130 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2921 (1993); Harvey, 2 F.3d at 1327. 
131 See generally Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 113 S. Ct. 2891; Timberlane Lumber Co., 549 F.2d 597. 
132 See Timberlane Lumber Co., 549 F.2d at 614. 
133 See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 823-27 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Robb, Cj., 
concurring) . 
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court may decline to hear a case based on theories of nonjusticiabil-
ity.134 For example, in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, a case brought 
under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) , 135 Senior Circuit Judge 
Robb argued that the issue was the international status of terror-
ism. 136 Judge Robb stated that the case involved standards that defy 
judicial application and that it touched on "sensitive matters of 
diplomacy that uniquely demand a singlevoiced [sic] statement of 
policy by the Government. "137 He then determined that the case was 
nonjusticiable.138 He further posited that terrorism, the subject of 
the lawsuit, is a subject historically "within the exclusive domain of 
the executive and legislative branches"139 and that the "possible 
consequences of judicial action in this area are injurious to the 
national interest. "140 
A court may also examine whether the U.S. law conflicts with the 
law of the foreign sovereign in which the action took place. l41 A 
court may analyze a number of factors to determine if there is 
sufficient conflict to warrant declining jurisdiction. In Mannington 
Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., for example, the Third Circuit deline-
ated ten factors to be weighed to determine the propriety of exer-
cising extraterritorial jurisdictionJ42 These factors include: (1) the 
degree of conflict; (2) the nationality of parties; (3) the relative 
importance of the alleged violation in the U.S. versus its importance 
abroad; (4) the availability of a remedy abroad or whether litigation 
is pending abroad; (5) the existence and extent of harm within the 
United States; (6) the possible effect the exercise of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction would have upon foreign relations; (7) if relief is 
granted, whether the party will be forced to perform an illegal act 
in either country or be under conflicting requirements; (8) whether 
the court can effect its order; (9) whether relief would be acceptable 
here if the foreign nation made similar contention; and (10) 
whether a treaty has addressed the issue.143 
134 See generally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. 
Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948); Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 823-27 (Robb, Cj., concur-
ring). 
135 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (West 1993). 
136 See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 823-27 (Robb, Cj., concurring). 
1371d. at 824. 
1381d. at 823. 
1391d. at 825. 
140ld. at 826. 
141 See Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 113 S. Ct. at 2910. 
142 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979). 
1431d. at 1297-98. 
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Even if there is a direct conflict between U.S. and foreign law, 
courts may still accept extraterritorial jurisdiction. "No tenet of 
international law prohibits Congress from punishing the wrongful 
conduct of its citizens, even if some of that conduct occurs 
abroad. "144 In Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California,145 for exam pIe, 
nineteen states and numerous private parties sued several reinsur-
ance companies alleging violations of the Sherman Act. 146 The al-
leged conspiracy involved a number of London based reinsurance 
companies, which conceded that the Sherman Act had extraterrito-
rial application where, as in Hartford, the conduct was intended to 
produce, and did in fact produce, a substantial effect in the United 
States.147 The defendants argued, however, that since the conduct 
alleged in the complaint was consistent with British law, U.S. laws 
should not apply for reasons of comity.148 
The court rejected this argument and stated that the application 
of U.S. antitrust laws is not barred merely because the conduct is 
lawful in the other country, unless there is a true conflict of law.149 
The court found that the activity at issue was legal in the foreign 
sovereign (Great Britain), but that the companies involved could 
comply with both U.S. and British lawsJ50 The court held that there 
was no real conflict because the insurance companies could have 
complied with both laws. 151 
If a court has jurisdiction to hear a case, it must still act with 
prudence because it is possible a judgment must be carried out in 
a jurisdiction that will not recognize the authority of the court. This 
was the case in United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries (lCI), 152 
a case in which a U.S. district court found ICI in violation of the 
Sherman Act and demanded that ICI cancel exclusive patents over-
seas to rectifY the situation.153 To comply, however, the company 
would have had to break a contractual agreement with a foreign 
company in Great Britain.154 The foreign company filed suit in its 
144 Harvey, 2 F.3d at 1329. 
145113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993). 
146Id. at 2895. 
147 See id. at 2895, 2909. 
148Id. at 2910. 
149Id. 
150 Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 113 S. Ct. at 2910-11. 
151Id. at 2911. 
152105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y 1952). 
153 See id. at 231. 
154Id. at 230. 
238 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW [Vol. XVIII, No.1 
home forum, seeking a declaration of its rights.155 The British court 
issued an injunction, which was upheld on appeal: the court stated 
that to hold otherwise would violate British law, and, therefore, the 
court was bound to uphold the injunction despite the U.S. deci-
sion.156 
III. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES AND THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS 
ACT (ATCA) 
To apply U.S. law extraterritorially, there must be a statute appli-
cable to the actions alleged in the complaint.157 A number of envi-
ronmental statutes are potentially applicable in circumstances like 
those alleged in the Aguinda Complaint, had they occurred within 
the sovereign borders of the United States. Statutes that might apply 
include: the Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA) , 158 the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response and Liability Act (CER-
CLA),159 and the Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation Act 
(OPLCA).160 
A. Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA) 
The Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA) , is one statute 
that would apply if the actions alleged in the Aguinda Complaint 
had occurred within the United States. RCRA is a comprehensive 
statute that regulates the entire waste cycle to prevent hazardous 
dumping and to hold persons liable should illegal dumping occur.161 
Congress included a statement of purpose in the statute, which states 
that the problem of hazardous waste dumping has exceeded the 
function of the state and has become a matter of national concern.162 
The statement of purpose further notes that "open dumping is 
particularly harmful to health, contaminates drinking water from 
underground and surface supplies, and pollutes the air and the land 
"163 
155 LOWENFELD, supra note 41, at 53. 
156Id. at 55. 
157REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 21, § 402 cmt. i. 
158 42 U.S.C.A. § 6901 et seq. (West 1983 & Supp. 1993). 
159 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601 et seq. (West 1983 & Supp. 1993). 
160 33 U.S.C.A. § 2701 et seq. (West 1993). 
161 See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAw AND POLICY: NATURE, LAw AND 
SOCIETY 251-52 (1992). 
162 42 U.S.CA. § 6901 (a)(4) (West 1983). 
163 42 U.S.CA. § 6901(b)(4) (West 1983). 
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Individuals are personally liable under RCRA when acting on 
behalf of a corporation, so there is no need to "pierce the corporate 
veil" to find liability; a court will find individual liability merely if a 
private party was in control of waste or its disposaI.164 Parties can be 
held liable if they are past or present handlers of hazardous materi-
als that endanger health or the environment, regardless of fault. 165 
RCRA specifically bans the use of waste oil for dust suppression or 
road treatment. 166 
RCRA contains a citizen suit provision that allows individuals to 
seek relief for damages for medical monitoring and for other losses, 
such as damage to property or the environment. 167 The provision is 
very broad, and allows any person to commence a civil action against 
any person alleged to be in violation "of any permit, standard, 
regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or order ... " pur-
suant to RCRA.168 The statute also allows for suits against contribu-
tors to "past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, 
or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste .... "169 Any suit filed 
pursuant to RCRA "shall be brought in the district court for the 
district in which the alleged violation occurred .... "170 
B. The Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and 
Liability Act (CERCLA) 
The Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and 
Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund) 171 is a very broad legislative 
scheme that finances the remediation of toxic waste sites. CERCLA 
provides for the generation of a fund by Congress, to be supple-
mented and replenished by private corporations who may be respon-
sible for known waste sites.172 The fund is used to clean up sites that 
have been identified and prioritized according to a national list. 173 
164 United States v. Northeastern Pharrn. & Chern. Co., Inc. (NEPACCO), 810 F.2d 726, 745 
(8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987). 
165 42 U.S.C.A. § 6973 (West Supp. 1993); see also NEPACCO, 810 F.2d at 740 (quoting H.R. 
Conf. Rep. No. 1133. 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 119 (1984)). 
166 42 U.S.C.A. § 6924 (l) (West Supp. 1993). 
167 42 U.S.C.A. § 6972 (a) (West Supp. 1993). 
168 42 U.S.C.A. § 6972(a) (1) (A) (West Supp. 1993). 
169 42 U.S.C.A. § 6972(a)(I)(B) (West Supp. 1993). 
17°42 U.S.C.A. § 6972(a) (West Supp. 1993). 
171 26 U.S.C.A. § 9601 et seq. (West 1989 & West Supp. 1994). 
172 26 U.S.C.A. § 9507 (West 1993). 
173 42 U.S.C.A. § 9605(a) (8)(B) (West Supp. 1993). 
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CERCLA provides for broad and expansive definitions to cover 
virtually all areas where dumping occurs. For example, the statute 
defines the term "environment" to include all waters, whether within 
the borders of the United States or in the contiguous zone-a zone 
defined by international law to be an agreed amount of miles 
around the shoreline of a sovereign in which the sovereign has 
jurisdiction and control.174 The term "environment" includes: "any 
other surface water, ground water, drinking water supply, land sur-
face or subsurface strata, or ambient air within the United States or 
under the jurisdiction of the United States."175 The statute defines 
"otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" to mean 
by virtue of U.S. citizenship, U.S. vessel documentation, or interna-
tional agreement. 176 
CERCLA also provides for broad categories of liability. For a 
company or individual to be liable under CERCLA, a court must 
find that the company or the individual was a past or present owner 
or operator of a hazardous waste facility, a past or present generator 
of hazardous substances, or a party that provides for the transporta-
tion of hazardous substances. 177 A facility is defined broadly to in-
clude virtually any place at which hazardous wastes have been 
placed.178 While CERCLA's statutory standards of liability are vague, 
courts have applied a strict liability standard.179 Courts have also 
determined that CERCLA permits, but does not mandate, joint and 
several liability.180 
CERCLA, like RCRA, also provides for citizen suitS. 181 Any person 
may commence a civil suit against an individual or entity who vio-
lates the standards of the act. 182 The statute also allows for foreign 
plaintiffs and gives the United States jurisdiction over "all controver-
sies arising under this chapter, without regard to the citizenship of 
the parties .... "183 
17442 U.S.C.A. § 9601 (8)(A) (West Supp. 1993); see also Convention on the Territorial Sea 
and Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 24, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205. 
175 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601 (8) (B) (West Supp. 1993). 
176 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(19) (West Supp. 1993). 
177 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a) (West Supp. 1993). 
178 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(9) (West Supp. 1993). 
179 See David A. Rich, Personal Liability for Hazardous Waste Cleanup: An Examination of 
CERCLA § 107, 13 B.C. ENVTL. MF. L. REv. 643, 655 (1986). 
180 United States v. Northeastern Pharrn. & Chern. Co. (NEPACCO), 579 F. Supp. 823, 844 
(WD. Mo. 1984), afJ'd in part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 
U.S. 848 (1987). 
181 See generally 42 U.S.C.A. § 9659 (West Supp. 1993). 
182 42 U.S.C.A. § 9659(a) (West Supp. 1993). 
183 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(b) (West Supp. 1993). 
1995] U.S. LAWS IN THE RAINFOREST 241 
C. Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation Act (OPLCA) 
The Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation Act (OPLCA) is a 
comprehensive statute designed to clean up oil SpillS.184 Like CER-
CLA, a fund is generated by Congress to facilitate the removal of oil 
from contaminated areas. 185 Persons found liable must pay damages 
for, among other things: removal costs, damages to natural re-
sources, damages to real or personal property, income lost due to 
loss of subsistence use of natural resources, loss of revenues or 
profits due to personal injury, or destruction or loss of property.186 
Liability extends to any party responsible for a vessel or facility from 
which oil is discharged.187 
Under OPLCA, a party may be liable to a foreign sovereign for 
natural resources belonging to, managed by, controlled by, or ap-
pertaining to the sovereign in any case in which the OPLCA ap-
plies. 188 The OPLCA provides for the designation of a foreign trustee 
to represent a foreign sovereign's interests in the remediation of its 
natural resources. 189 The trustee must be appointed by a foreign 
government to act on that foreign government's behalf.190 
The OPLCA defines a claimant as any person or government who 
presents a claim for compensation under the Act. 191 A foreign claim-
ant is specifically identified as: "(1) a person residing in a foreign 
country; (2) the government of a foreign country; [or] (3) an 
agency or political subdivision of a foreign country."192 
The OPLCA permits a foreign claimant to recover removal costs 
or damages resulting from a discharge within a foreign country 
under limited circumstances, including, but not limited to: dis-
charges from a facility within the jurisdiction of the United States 
or within the contiguous zone, discharges from a vessel within the 
navigable waters within the foreign sovereign's jurisdiction, or dis-
charges from any vessel carrying oil as cargo between two United 
States ports. 193 A treaty or executive agreement between the United 
States and the claimant's country must specifically authorize a for-
184 33 U.S.C.A. § 2701 et seq. (West 1993). 
185 26 U.S.C.A. § 9509 (West 1993). 
186 33 U.S.C.A. § 2702 (West 1993). 
187Id. 
188 33 U.S.C.A. § 2706(a) (4) (West 1993). 
189 33 U.S.C.A. § 2706(b) (5) (West 1993). 
190Id. 
191 33 U.S.C.A. § 2701(4) (West 1993). 
192 33 U.S.C.A. § 2707(c) (West 1993). 
193 33 U.S.C.A. § 2707(b) (West 1993). 
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eign claimant to recover. 194 If "the Secretary of State, in consultation 
with the Attorney General and other appropriate officials, ... cer-
tifie[s] that the claimant's country provides a comparable remedy 
for United States claimants," a foreign claimant may recover. 195 
The United States and Ecuador enacted the Treaty of Peace, 
Friendship, Navigation and Commerce in 1839.196 Article 13 states, 
in pertinent part: "Both the contracting parties promise and engage, 
formally, to ... [leave] open and free to them, the tribunals of 
justice, for their judicial recourse, on the same terms which are usual 
and customary with the natives or citizens of the country, in which 
they may be."197 The treaty apparently gives equal access, and there-
fore a comparable remedy, to citizens of each country. 
D. The Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) 
The Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) 198 was first passed as part of 
the Judiciary Act of 1789, and applies extraterritorially in a number 
of cases to extend the jurisdiction of U.S. courts over tort claims.199 
The ATCA states: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction 
over any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in viola-
tion of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."200 Thus, 
the prima facie requirements of an action under the statute are: (l) 
the plaintiff must be an alien; (2) the cause of action must lie in 
tort; and (3) the tort alleged must be a violation of the law of nations 
or a treaty of the United States.201 
In the earliest cases, courts extended jurisdiction under the ATCA 
over private parties. The first such case was Bolchos v. Darrel. 202 In 
that case, the South Carolina District Court, without explanation, 
stated that it had jurisdiction under the ATCA.203 Then, in 1961, the 
194 33 U.S.C.A. § 2707(a) (1) (B) (West 1993). 
195 [d. 
196 Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Navigation and Commerce, June 13, 1839, U.S.-Ecuador, 8 
Stat. 534 [hereinafter Ecuador Treaty J. 
197 [d. art. 13. 
198 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (West 1993). 
199 See generally In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 978 F.2d 493 
(9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2960 (1993); Filartiga v. Peiia Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d 
Cir. 1980); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988); if. Tel-Oren v. Libyan 
Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985). 
200 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (West 1993). 
201 [d. 
202 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795). 
203 [d. at 810. The plaintiff, captain of a vessel which brought into port a Spanish prize 
holding mortgaged slaves, sued the agent of the individual holding the mortgage because the 
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District Court of Maryland accepted jurisdiction over private parties 
under the ATCA in Adra v. Clift.204 Adra involved a child custody 
dispute in which the court held that it had jurisdiction because an 
action for child custody is a tort, and the mother of the child had 
falsified the passport of the child in violation of the law of nations. 205 
It is significant to note that the activity that violated the law of 
nations was not the basis for the suit, but only the basis for the 
court's jurisdiction. 206 
Over the next two decades, a number of suits were unsuccessful 
under the ATCA.207 Then, in 1980, the Second Circuit decided the 
landmark case, Filartiga v. Peiia-lrala.208 In Filartiga, the Paraguayan 
father and sister of a young man who had been kidnapped and 
tortured by a Paraguayan general brought suit in the Eastern District 
of New York. 209 
The issue in Filartiga was whether the acts alleged violated the law 
of nations.210 The plaintiffs submitted several affidavits from distin-
guished legal scholars stating unanimously that the law of nations 
prohibits the use oftorture under the color oflaw.211 The court held 
that, although there was no universal agreement on the precise 
extent of human rights guaranteed by the U.N. Charter, this defen-
dant's actions violated universally accepted norms of international 
law and human rights and, therefore, fell under the ATCA.212 
The court asserted a number of propositions regarding the deter-
mination of what violations of international law are sufficient to 
invoke the statute. The court cited The Paquete Habana213 for the 
agent seized and sold the slaves. Id. The court found that the two private parties in the suit 
were aliens and the action was in tort for an alleged violation of a treaty between the United 
States and France. Id. 
204 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961). 
205 See id. at 862, 864. 
206Id. at 863. The court found jurisdiction because the defendant's act of falsitying her 
daughter's passport violated the law of nations. Id. The lawsuit, however, involved a child 
custody dispute. Id. 
207 See generally Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978), eert. 
denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979) (willful negligence in air disaster not violation oflaw of nations); 
lIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975) (fraud, conversion, corporate waste not 
violations of law of nations); Khedivial Line, S.A.E. v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 278 F.2d 49 (2d 
Cir. 1960) (international law does not extend universal right to unimpeded access to ports). 
208 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
209Id. at 878. 
210Id. 
211 Id. at 879. This tactic was also successful in Forti, 694 F. Supp. at 709. 
212 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878. 
213 175 U.S. 677 (1900). 
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proposition that "where there is no treaty, and no controlling execu-
tive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the 
customs and usages of civilized nations. "214 The court also cited 
Romero v. International Terminal operating CO.215 for the proposition 
that the law of nations is not stagnant, but should be considered 
part of an evolutionary process.216 The court further determined 
that a cause of action must allege a violation of the law of nations, 
not merely a cause of action arising under the law of nations.217 
A number of cases decided since Filartiga have narrowed the 
application of the ATCA. In Tel-Oren v. Lillyan Arab Republic,218 
survivors and representatives of persons murdered in an armed 
attack on a civilian bus in Israel brought suit against the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO) under the ATCA.219 The court is-
sued a per curiam decision affirming the district court's dismissal of 
the case. 22°Judge Edwards,Judge Bork, and Senior Judge Robb each 
submitted concurring opinions.221 
Judge Edwards relied on Filartiga for the proposition that the 
ATCA provides a right of action and a forum for any suit alleging a 
violation of the law of nations.222 Judge Edwards also determined 
that after Filartiga "persons may be susceptible to civil liability if they 
commit either a crime traditionally warranting universal jurisdiction 
or an offense that comparably violates current norms of interna-
tional law. "223 He cited the then-tentative draft of the Restatement 
(Third) for the proposition that certain actions practiced, encour-
aged, or condoned by a State violate international law.224 Judge 
Edwards held that the PLO was not a state actor, that the acts of 
terrorism did not violate international law, and, therefore, the com-
plaint was not actionable under the ATCA.225 
214 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880. 
215 358 U.S. 354 (1959), reh'g denied, 359 U.S. 962 (1959). 
216 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 887. 
217Id. In other words, human rights violations are of mutual, not several, concern; the fact 
that several nations consider freedom to contract a right would be of several, not mutual, 
concern. Id. at 888. For a discussion of jus cogens by a U.S. court see Siderman de Blake v. 
Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 714-19 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1812 
(1993) . 
218 726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
219Id. 
220Id. 
221Id. 
222Id. at 780 (Edwards,]., concurring). 
223 Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 781 (Edwards,]., concurring). 
224Id. 
225Id. at 791-92. Judge Edwards stated that he was not prepared to extend the definition 
of violation of the "law of nations" without any direction from the Supreme Court. Id. at 792. 
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Judge Bork concurred with Judge Edwards, but declinedjurisdic-
tion for failure to state a claim. He concluded that there must be an 
allegation of conduct that is somehow "codified" as a violation of 
international law to find a cause of action under the ATCA.226 He 
stated that unless an international agreement is self-executing (pro-
vides a private right of action), no cause of action willlie.227 Senior 
Judge Robb also concurred, but relied on the political question 
doctrine.228 
Subsequent caselaw creates uncertainty regarding when, if ever, 
the ATCA applies. In Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan,229 then:Judge Scalia 
stated that because there is little legislative history surrounding the 
Act, it may conceivably only cover "private, non governmental acts 
that are contrary to treaty [sic] or the law of nations. "230 He stated 
that there was no treaty that covered the acts alleged in the com-
plaint and that the law of nations "does not reach private, non state 
conduct of this sort for the reasons stated by Judge Edwards in 
Tel-Oren . . . . "231 
The U.S. Supreme Court briefly addressed the ATCA in Argentine 
Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.232 In Amerada Hess, the Court 
held that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) 233 was the 
only basis for jurisdiction over a foreign state, and that it therefore 
supplants the ATCA in situations involving official state action.234 
Amerada Hess involved the attack of a neutral ship during war. The 
Court held that the FSIA was the sole basis for jurisdiction over a 
foreign sovereign in any action in U.S. courts. 235 
In 1992, the Ninth Circuit addressed two applications of the 
ATCA, both involving alleged instances of torture by an individual 
acting under the color of law.236 In Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, 
the court gave an extensive analysis of jus cogens and the applicability 
of the FSIA in cases which involve the violation of jus cogens.237 The 
226 Id. at 799 (Bork, CJ., concurring). 
227 Id. at 80l. 
228 Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 823 (Robb, CJ., concurring). Judge Robb stated that "[f1ederal 
courts are not in a position to determine the international status of terrorist acts." Id. 
229 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
230 Id. at 206. 
231 Id. at 206-07 (emphasis added). 
232 488 U.S. 428 (1989). 
233 28 U.S.CA §§ 1602-11 (West 1993). 
234 488 U.S. at 434. 
235 Id. at 439. 
236In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 
1992), eeri. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2960 (1993); Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 
F.2d at 714-19. 
237 965 F.2d at 714-19. 
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court closely examined the plaintiffs argument that the FSIA should 
not apply because the FSIA is based on international law, and inter-
national law does not recognize acts in violation of jus cog ens as state 
actions.238 The court was convinced by this argument, but stated that 
Argentina was immune under the FSIA because all FSIA cases must 
be addressed "through the prism of Amerada Hess,"239 and Congress 
had not given any indication that violations of jus cog ens should 
trump the FSIA.240 
In the case of In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights 
Litigation, the Ninth Circuit found that the defendant, the daughter 
of former Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos, had admitted 
acting on her own authority and, therefore, was not immune under 
the FSIA.241 The court stated that Congress intended § 1350 to 
provide a federal cause of action for "transitory torts"-tort actions 
that follow a tortfeasor wherever he or she goes. 242 The court held 
that there was jurisdiction under the ATCA because acts of torture 
are violations of the law of nations. 243 
IV. APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EXTRATERRITORIAL 
JURISDICTION TO U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES AND ACUINDA 
V. TEXACO 
A. Forum Non Conveniens 
In Aguinda v. Texaco, Texaco has already filed a motion to dismiss 
on the basis of forum non conveniens. U.S. District Court Judge 
Vincent Broderick, in an unpublished decision dated April 11, 1994, 
denied Texaco's motion. 244 Judge Broderick reserved decision on 
Texaco's motions to allow discovery because it was important to 
differentiate between events that occurred within the United 
States-such as specific or generalized directions initiating events in 
the rainforest-and those that occurred outside the United States.245 
238 [d. at 718. 
239 [d. 
240 [d. at 719. 
241 978 F.2d at 498. 
242 [d. at 503. 
243 [d. at 499. 
244 Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 7257, (S.D.N.Y Apr. 11, 1994) [hereinafter April 
Memo]. 
245 [d. at 2-3. 
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This inquiry was limited, however, to information that could be 
secured voluntarily.246 
The court was concerned with the possible need for injunctive 
relief against Texaco, specifically ordering the company to refrain 
from making decisions in the United States that initiate such activi-
ties abroad without proper safeguards.247 The court distinguished a 
similar case, Sequihua v. Texaco, recently dismissed on the grounds 
of forum non conveniens-48 and noted that all of the challenged 
activity alleged in Sequihua occurred within Ecuador.249 The court 
found that unlike Sequihua, the Aguinda Complaint alleged that the 
decisions, in whole or in part, were made within the United States.250 
B. Congressional Intent 
1. RCRA 
In light of the Third Circuit's recent decision in United States v. 
Harvey,251 a court may find sufficient congressional intent for RCRA 
to apply extraterritorially where the responsible party is a U.S. citi-
zen. RCRA's provisions to fight pollution detrimental to human 
health and the environment are of unprecedented scope and are 
arguably as broad as the statutory language in Harvey.252 RCRA is a 
statute that regulates the entire waste cycle and thoroughly addresses 
hazardous waste issues in areas never before regulated.253 Congress, 
therefore, may have intended RCRA to apply outside the United 
States when a U.S. corporation pollutes abroad. 
Despite the broad language of RCRA and its apparent far reach-
ing scope, the District Court for the Southern District of New York 
refused to apply RCRA extraterritorially in Amlon Metals Inc. v. FMC 
Corp.254 The District Court's interpretation of RCRA in Amlon, how-
ever, seems incongruous with the plain language of the statute. The 
waste export provision of the statute reflects congressional concern 
246 Id. 
247 Id. at 8. 
248No. 93 Civ. 3432 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 27,1994). 
249 April Memo, supra note 244, at 9 (quoting Sequihua v. Texaco, No. 93 Civ. 3432 (S.D. 
Tex. Jan 27, 1994». 
250 Id. 
251 2 F.3d 1318 (3d Cir. 1993). 
252 See id. at 1327; see also PLATER ET AL., supra note 161, at 251-52. 
253 See PLATER ET AL., supra note 161, at 251-52 
254 775 F. Supp. 668, 676 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
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with wastes exported in situations similar to that in Amlon.255 This 
assertion is supported by Senator Mitchell's remarks that "no Ameri-
can ally or trading partner [should be] saddled with U.S. wastes it 
does not want or does not have the capacity to handle in an envi-
ronmentally sound manner."256 The court in Amlon avoided this 
application by separating the export provision from the citizen suit 
provision, thereby disallowing the extraterritorial application in a 
private suit. 257 
Citizen suit provisions, however, are often inserted in legislation 
to ensure that statutory provisions are enforced, not to limit the 
application of a statute.258 An already burdened agency cannot 
prosecute every infraction, and citizens, therefore, act as private 
"Attorneys General" to enforce various provisions of the statute, or 
to sue for damages if appropriate. 259 In a situation where toxins are 
exported, a court's failure to apply RCRA extraterritorially would 
eviscerate the statute. 
In Harvey, however, the court applied the statute extraterritorially 
precisely to avoid such a result.260 Furthermore, the courts failure to 
apply RCRA in situations where toxins are exported encourages U.S. 
companies to ship hazardous wastes overseas. If the shipment is not 
discovered prior to export, once the wastes are within a foreign 
sovereign-and, perhaps, once they are on the high seas-the stat-
ute no longer applies. 
Even if a court applies the more restrictive "affirmative intent" 
standard articulated by Justice Rehnquist in E.E. 0. C. v. Arabian 
American Oil Co. (Aramco) , the statute most likely shows sufficient 
congressional intent for RCRA to apply extraterritorially.261 The spe-
cific inclusion of the export provisions and Senator Mitchell's re-
marks indicate such an affirmative intent by Congress.262 Contrary 
to the decision in Amlon, therefore, RCRA may have an extraterri-
torial application in some instances. 
Even if there is congressional intent for RCRA to apply extrater-
ritorially, it is not likely a court would find congressional intent to 
apply RCRA extraterritorially in a situation like that alleged in the 
255 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(d) (6) (West 1993). 
256 Amlon, 775 F. Supp at 674 (citing 130 Congo Rec. 20816 (1984)). 
257 [d. 
258 See PLATER ET AL., supra note 161, at 303-04. 
259 See id. at 303. 
260 2 F.3d at 1327. 
261 See 499 U.S. 244, 249 (1991). 
262 See Amlon, 775 F. Supp. at 674. 
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Aguinda Complaint.263 Congress most likely did not intend a subsidi-
ary of a U.S. corporation, or a U.S. corporation itself operating 
abroad, to be liable under RCRA. The definition of persons liable 
is broad, but much of the statutory language seemingly limits RCRA 
to the United States.264 For example, while the provisions expressly 
apply broadly to a case commenced against past or present owners 
or operators of, or any person contributing to, a dump site, its 
provisions asserting that venue is the district court for the district in 
which the alleged violations occurred strongly suggests that Con-
gress did not intend to include extraterritorial dumping within the 
scope of the statute.265 If the wastes are generated overseas, RCRA 
most likely does not apply extraterritorially. 
2. CERCLA 
The unprecedented scope of CERCLA may evidence sufficient 
congressional intent for the statue to apply extraterritorially. The 
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA), which 
amended CERCLA in 1984, is so pro-liability that some suggest its 
acronym ought to be changed to RACHEL because the Reauthori-
zation Act Confirms How Everyone's Liable.266 The broadness of the 
statute is reflected in its definition of the environment, which in-
cludes areas within the United States and areas otherwise subject to 
the jurisdiction of the United States.267 Thus a court may, like in 
Harvey, find sufficient intent to apply CERCLA extraterritorially.268 
It is unlikely, however, that its scope alone is sufficient to show 
congressional intent for the statute to apply extraterritorially. Failure 
to apply CERCLA in an extraterritorial setting would not greatly 
curtail the scope and usefulness of the statute.269 Likewise, if a court 
applies the restrictive "affirmative intent" test from Aramco, it is even 
less likely that it would find the statute to have an extraterritorial 
application.27o Other factors suggest that CERCLA has only domestic 
effect, including: the fact that there is a federal fund for cleanups, 
the fact that sites are listed in a national database (CERCLIS), and 
263 See Aguinda Complaint, supra note S, at 4-5; see also supra notes 10-IS and accompany-
ing text. 
264 See, e.g., 42 U.S.CA § 6903(15) (West Supp. 1993). 
265 See 42 U.S.CA § 692S(a) (1) (West Supp. 1993). 
266 See PLATER ET AL., supra note 161, at 279. 
267 See 42 U.S.CA § 9601(S) (B) (West Supp. 1993). 
268 2 F.3d at 1327. 
269 See id. 
270 See Aramco, 499 U.S. at 259. 
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the fact that sites are prioritized according to a national priority list 
(NPL).271 
3. The Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation Act (OPLCA) 
The Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation Act (OPLCA),272 
like CERCLA and RCRA, is a broad statute that addresses a serious 
problem. The scope of the Act is not sufficiently broad to cover the 
acts alleged in the Aguinda Complaint. The Act does specifically 
allow for foreign claimants, but it limits the situations in which a 
foreign claimant may have a cause of action.273 The actions alleged 
in the Aguinda Complaint do not fit these situations. 
The OPLCA allows for recovery if a discharge is made within the 
navigable waters of a foreign sovereign;274 this type of discharge is 
not alleged in the Aguinda Complaint. Under the OPLCA, foreign 
claimants must be authorized to recover pursuant to a treaty or 
executive agreement between the United States and the claimant's 
country, or the Secretary of State must certifY that the claimant's 
country provides a comparable remedy in the United States.275 It is 
not clear, however, what is meant by comparable remedy. There is a 
treaty between the United States and Ecuador which gives reciprocal 
access to tribunals of justice, but it is not clear whether access alone 
is a comparable remedy.276 
C. The Effects Doctrine 
Even if a court found congressional intent for RCRA, CERCLA, 
or the OPLCA to apply extraterritorially, the court will still examine 
if the actions fall under the effects doctrine. The court will analyze 
the actions alleged to determine if there is a domestic effect caused 
by the overseas conduct.277 Thus, if the examining court finds that 
Texaco's actions do not produce such an effect, and there IS no 
other basis for jurisdiction, the court will dismiss the case.278 
271 See PLATER ET AL., supra note 161 at 882, 886. 
272 33 U.S.CA § 2701 et seq. (West 1993). 
273 See id. 
274 See Aguinda Complaint, supra note 8, at 22-27; see also supra notes 10-18 and accompa-
nying text. 
275 33 U.S.CA § 2707(a) (1) (B) (West 1993). 
276 See Ecuador Treaty, supra note 196, art. 13. 
277 See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 113 S. Ct. at 2909. 
278 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 21, § 402 and comments. 
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The impact of the acts alleged in the Aguinda Complaint is wide-
spread water pollution and deforestation in Ecuador, and the likely 
death of hundreds of indigenous peoples from cancer and other 
toxic-related illnesses.279 These effects are only found within the 
sovereign borders of Ecuador,280 and are unlikely to be felt within 
the United States. Any effects within the United States would be 
minimal at best, and there is a strong argument that there would be 
no domestic effects. 
Environmental damage and degradation, however, are global is-
sues, with long and short term implications that effect every nation, 
including the United States. Widespread deforestation, desertifica-
tion, global warming, and holes in the Ozone Layer are all issues 
that concern the international community.281 This is because these 
issues know no boundaries and impact on all nations, albeit on some 
more directly than on others. 
U.S. courts are unlikely to declare the amorphous effects of "loss 
of biodiversity" or "global warming" as domestic effects without 
more direction from Congress. Despite the global consequences of 
corporate actions overseas that cause such global environmental 
problems, it is unlikely that a U.S. court will find them sufficiently 
compelling to warrant the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
Courts that find sufficient domestic effects point to more specific, 
easily defined effects, such as social problems caused by drugs,282 
child pornography,283 or unfair trade practices.284 
It is even less likely a court will find that Texaco intended to 
produce these effects on the environment-either globally or in 
Ecuador. Some courts have held that they will only assert extraterri-
torial jurisdiction if there is an intended effect. 285 Environmental 
degradation was not likely the intent of Texaco. The most probable 
domestic effect intended by Texaco was increased values for share-
holders. 
279 See James Brook, Pollution Of Water Tied to Oil In Ecuador, NY TIMES, Mar. 22, 1994, at 
Cll. 
280 See id. 
281 See generally, e.g., Convention on Biological Diversity, June 1992, 31 LL.M. 818; Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change, June 1992,31 LL.M. 849. 
282 See Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882, 887 (5th Cir. 1967). 
283 See Harvey, 2 F.3d at 1328. 
284 See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 615 (9th Cir. 
1977). 
285 See United States v. Aluminum Corp. of America (ALCOA), 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d 
Cir. 1945). 
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If the allegations against Texaco are true, however, one intended 
domestic effect may be unfair competition. Companies that drill oil 
within the borders of the United States must do so at a significantly 
higher cost because they must carefully dispose of the wastes in 
accordance with U.S. laws. Domestic companies are at an extreme 
disadvantage to companies that improperly dispose of wastes. The 
potential effect is that companies who have the benefit of concession 
agreements with developing countries make windfall profits at the 
expense of the local indigenous peoples, while domestic drilling 
companies operate at a lower profit margin, because they must meet 
higher environmental standards and still compete with the price of 
imported oil. 
Unfair competition is probably not, however, a sufficient domestic 
effect for a U.S. court to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction. The 
activities alleged in the Aguinda Complaint are not such that they 
result in the manipulation of business practices in the United States, 
as did the British insurance companies in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. 
v. California.286 The actions probably have minimal effect on U.S. 
foreign commerce, unlike the actions in United States v. Aluminum 
Co. of America (ALCOA).287 The dumping alleged in the Aguinda 
Complaint will not be adding to the already pressing problem of 
pollution within the United States, as was the case with the child 
pornography issue in United States v. Harvey.288 It is therefore un-
likely that a court will find a domestic effect sufficient to warrant 
extraterritorial jurisdiction under U.S. environmental laws. 
D. The Principle of Universal Jurisdiction and the Alien Tort Claims 
Act (ATCA) 
There is a strong case for a court to apply the ATCA extraterrito-
rially and assert jurisdiction in Aguinda v. Texaco. Two of the three 
requiremen ts for a cause of action to stand under the ATCA are met: 
the plaintiffs are aliens, specifically Ecuadoran indigenous peoples 
suffering from the effects of widespread environmental degrada-
tion,289 and, the complaint requests relief under various tort theories, 
including negligence and strict liability for the toxic tort of wide-
spread oil pollution and dumping.290 
286 See 113 S.Ct. at 2898; see also supra notes 118-129 and accompanying text. 
287 See 148 F.2d at 444. 
288 See 2 F.3d at 1328 (quoting United States v. Thomas, 893 F.2d 1066, 1068-69 (9th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 826 (1990)). 
289 Aguinda Complaint, supra note 8, at 3-4. 
290 Id. at 27-33. 
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It is unclear, however, whether the third requirement is met, 
because the actions alleged may not violate the law of nations or a 
treaty. 291 As previously noted, a court examines international law 
documents, including specific treaties and conventions, and 
affidavits submitted by international legal scholars, to determine if 
an action violates the law of nations. 292 
1. Violations of Treaties or International Contract Law 
Treaties, by definition, are between sovereign states.293 It is difficult 
to find a treaty that these actions by a private party within a foreign 
sovereign violate. They may, however, violate the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development (Rio Declaration).294 
Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration bestows on States the "respon-
sibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control 
do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas 
beyond the limit of national jurisdiction."295 Principle 6 of the Rio 
Declaration recognizes the "special situation and needs of develop-
ing countries .... [T]hose most environmentally vulnerable, shall 
be given special priority. "296 Principle 7 states that "developed coun-
tries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the interna-
tional pursuit of sustainable development .... "297 Principle 13 spe-
cifically mandates States to use their national law to provide 
compensation for victims of pollution and environmental damage: 
States shall develop national law regarding liability and 
compensation for the victims of pollution and other envi-
ronmental damage. States shall also cooperate ... to de-
velop further international law regarding liability and com-
pensation for adverse effects of environmental damage 
caused by activities within their jurisdiction or control to 
areas beyond their contro1.298 
291 See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880. 
292 See id. at 879; Forti, 694 F. Supp. at 709. 
293 See WESTON ET AL., supra note 3, at 44; see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
May 23,1969, art. 2(1) (a), UN Doc. A/Conf.39/27, at 289(1969), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, reprinted 
in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
294 Report of the u.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration of the 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 
15l/5/Rev.l (1992), reprinted in, 31 I.L.M. 876, [hereinafter Rio Declaration]. 
295 [d. principle 2, 31 I.L.M. at 876. 
296 [d. principle 6, 31 I.L.M. at 877. 
297 [d. principle 7, 31 I.L.M. at 877. 
298 [d. principle 13, 31 I.L.M. at 878. 
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The United States has signed this agreement, but has not yet 
ratified the document. Nor has the treaty come into force. When a 
country signs an international agreement, however, it must try to 
effectuate the agreement's goals until ratification.299 Article 18 of the 
Vienna Convention on Treaties states that "[a] State is obliged to 
refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a 
treaty when . . . it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instru-
ments constituting the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or 
approval .... "300 A country that does not do so shows bad faith and 
is in violation of customary international law. 301 The United States, 
therefore, must not act in such a way to defeat the object and 
purpose of the Rio Declaration. 
Failure to take jurisdiction is a failure to comply with principle 13 
of the Rio Declaration, which requires States to "develop national 
law regarding liability and compensation for the victims of pollution 
and other environmental damage."302 The United States, by declin-
ing jurisdiction, would indicate a failure to "develop further inter-
national law regarding liability and compensation for adverse effects 
of environmental damage caused by activities within their jurisdic-
tion or control to areas beyond their control."303 
The United States has jurisdiction over Texaco, Inc. because Tex-
aco is a U.S. corporation. The court may therefore assert jurisdiction 
over Texaco under the nationality principle.304 If the court asserted 
jurisdiction over Texaco in this case, it would be further developing 
the law "regarding liability and compensation for adverse effects of 
environmental damage caused by activities within their jurisdiction 
.... "305 The failure to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction is a lost 
opportunity to further develop the law. Failure to assert extraterri-
torial jurisdiction in this case is, therefore, contrary to principle 13 
of the Rio Declaration. 
Failure to take jurisdiction in this case may be a failure to take 
responsibility in the international pursuit of sustainable develop-
ment.306 By asserting jurisdiction, the United States would discour-
299 See Vienna Convention, supra note 293, art. 18. 
300 Id. 
301 See WESTON ET AL., supra note 3, at 73-74. 
302 See Rio Declaration, supra note 294, art. 13. 
303 See id. 
304 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 21, § 402 (e); see also text accompanying notes 
26-28. 
305 See Rio Declaration, supra note 294, art. 13. 
306 See id. art. 7. 
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age activities by its nationals that would cause environmental dam-
age overseas. If the United States does not take any action, there is 
no incentive for U.S. multinational corporations to take responsibil-
ity and operate in an environmentally sound manner overseas. In 
developing countries with unequal bargaining power and a strong 
need for technological advancement, this often can result in dam-
aging environmental consequences. Therefore, failure to take juris-
diction in this case may be a failure to take responsibility in the 
international pursuit of sustainable development. 
It also is possible for the court to interpret the concession agree-
ment between Texaco and Ecuador as a quasi-treaty under the 
ATCA. A contract between a sovereign nation and a private party, 
also known as a concession agreement, usually allows a private party 
to operate within the sovereign in a mutually beneficial economic 
arrangement.307 Such agreements allow private parties with ad-
vanced technology to develop natural resources and pay royalties to 
the sovereign state. Jurisdictional issues often arise when a party 
breaches the agreement.308 
The agreement between Texaco and Ecuador was such a conces-
sion agreement. Texaco allegedly supplied its equipment, technol-
ogy, expertise, and management to drill for and extract oil in Ecua-
dor.309 In exchange, the Ecuadoran government presumably 
received royalties from the extraction and sale of the crude oil. If 
the court interpreted a concession agreement as a quasi-treaty under 
the ATCA, and that agreement guaranteed that development would 
proceed in an environmentally sound manner, a cause of action 
would lie. 
There is no precedent, however, for a U.S. court to interpret such 
an agreement as a quasi-treaty. The court may consider a violation 
of a concession agreement a breach of contract and give Ecuador a 
cause of action under contract theories. This would not, however, 
give rise to a cause of action under the ATCA for the plaintiffs in 
Aguinda. 
The international community usually considers concession agree-
ments as contracts, and not as treaties of any sort.310 In fact, such 
concession agreements present peculiar problems under interna-
307 For a discussion of the treatment of concession agreements in international law, see 
generally WESTON ET AL., supra note 3, at 418-512. 
308 [d. at 418-19. 
309 See Aguinda Complaint, supra note 8, at 22-24. 
310 See WESTON ET AL., supra note 3, at 418. 
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tional law, as only States are considered subject to international 
law.311 Nonetheless, these agreements are recognized as interna-
tional agreements by the international community, and it is possible 
that a U.S. court could interpret Texaco's concession agreement as 
a quasi-treaty for purposes of jurisdiction under the ATCA. 
2. General International Human Rights Law 
The large scale degradation of the local environment to the point 
of possible extinction of the local population may violate basic 
human rights under international conventions and the U.N. Char-
ter. The U.N. Charter calls on all Member States to respect human 
rights. 312 The international community has codified various conven-
tions and treaties that nations universally consider human rights 
violations.313 
Examples of human rights violations are found in a number of 
U.N. documents and other multilateral treaties. For example, inter-
national agreements recognize the right to the preservation of 
health and an adequate standard of living.314 A number of interna-
tional agreements also recognize the right of the individual to be 
free from cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.315 
Violations of basic human rights may be violations of customary 
international law because they are recognized in many international 
agreements. U.S. courts have already recognized the violation of 
basic human rights as a violation of universal internationallaw.316 If 
the international community considers severe environmental degra-
311 See id. at 419. 
312 U.N. CHARTER art. 1, i 3. 
313 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., U.N. Doc. 
A/810 at 71 (1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. 
GAOR, 21st Sess., 1496th plen. mtg. Supp. No. 16, at 62, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); The 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 
U.N.T.S. 221; American Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 
OAS.T.S. No. 36, at 1, OAS. Off. Rec. OEA/ser L/V /11.23, doc. 21, rev. 6 (English 1979), 
reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673 (1978); see also Case 9647, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 147, 166, OEA/Ser. 
L/V/II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987). 
314 See, e.g., American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, 
adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States (March 30-May 2,1948), 
art. XI, Bogota, OAS. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. L/V/1.4 rev. (1965); Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, supra note 313, art. 25. 
315 See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 313, art. 5. 
316 See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878. Universal International Law, also called jus cogens, is a body 
of law which recognizes certain acts by definition violate international law. See supra notes 
36-39 and accompanying text. For a discussion by a U.S. court of the difference in magnitude 
between customary international law and jus cogens see Siderman de Blake, 965 F.2d at 715-716. 
1995] U.S. LAws IN THE RAINFOREST 257 
dation to be a violation of these fundamental human rights, the 
court might find a valid cause of action under the ATCA. 
This conclusion is consistent with previous holdings in U.S. courts. 
For example, in both Forti v. Suarez-Mason and Filartiga v. Peiia-lrala, 
the plaintiffs submitted affidavits by prominent legal scholars that 
indicated the crime alleged in both complaints was a violation of 
internationally recognized human rights. 317 In Siderman de Blake v. 
Republic of Argentina, the court recognized that violations of basic 
human rights were violations of jus cogens--values considered fun-
damental by the international community-and not simply viola-
tions of customary internationallaw.318 
This conclusion is also consistent with Sanchez-Espinoza v. Rea-
gan,319 which held that the ATCA did not apply to private parties 
under the circumstances alleged.320 Then:Judge Scalia specifically 
stated that the ATCA "may conceivably ... cover only private, non-
governmental acts that are contrary to [a] treaty or the law of 
nations."321 Ifthe environmental degradation alleged in the Aguinda 
Complaint violates these internationally recognized legal rights, Tex-
aco may be in violation of the law of nations and the court should 
find a colorable claim under the ATCA. 
3. The Genocide Convention 
The actions alleged in the Aguinda Complaint arguably violate 
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide 
(Genocide Convention) .322 The Genocide Convention defines geno-
cide as "acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, 
a national, ethnic, racial or religious group .... "323 The Convention 
makes it a crime not only to commit genocide, but also to conspire, 
incite, or attempt to commit genocide.324 The Genocide Convention 
317 See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 879 (holding that torture under color of authority is violation 
of internationally recognized human rights); FOrti, 694 F. Supp. at 709 (holding that "disap-
pearance" is violation of internationally recognized human rights). 
318 965 F.2d at 715. 
319770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
320Id. at 206--07. 
321 Id. at 206. 
322 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, Jan. 12, 1951, art. 2, __ 
U.S.T. __ , 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. 
323Id. The acts specifically enumerated include: killing or causing serious bodily or mental 
harm to the group, the infliction of conditions calculated to destroy the group, imposing 
measures to prevent births within the group, or the forcible transfer of children to another 
group.ld. 
324Id. art. 3. 
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specifically provides that both governments and private parties who 
commit genocide are liable.325 
Texaco's drilling operations have allegedly caused the deprivation 
of clean drinking water to the Indians in the Oriente, the Ecuadoran 
rainforest. 326 The widespread dumping has caused the total destruc-
tion and environmental degradation of large areas of the rainfor-
est. 327 This, in turn, will probably result in the extinction of several 
Indian tribes because the natives depend on the rainforest for their 
survival.328 
There are several reasons why it might be inappropriate to apply 
the Genocide Convention to the situation in which natives are 
harmed, possibly to the point of extinction. The first reason is lack 
of intent: Article 2 of the Genocide Convention requires intent to 
destroy the group.329 It is unlikely that a court will find that Texaco 
had the requisite intent to destroy the native tribes. 
Arrother reason is that applying the Genocide Convention in this 
instance might serve to demystify and dilute the Convention by 
broadening its scope. The international community would probably 
not consider extreme environmental degradation genocide, and it 
is probably not advisable to do so. The international community 
regards genocide as a truly heinous crime, one which is strictly 
forbidden. 330 If the international community recognizes activities 
that many would find acceptable within the meaning of genocide, 
it may somewhat discredit the Convention and limit its impact as a 
universal crime. 
E. The International Community: Potential Reactions to the 
Extraterritorial Application of Jurisdiction Over Environmental 
Issues 
As already noted, U.S. courts will not assert extraterritorial juris-
diction in the face of a severe conflict of laws either with the foreign 
325Id. art. 4. 
326 See Aguinda Complaint, supra note 8, at 25-27. 
327Id. 
328William Andrew Shutkin, Note, International Human Rights Law and the Earth: The 
Protection of Indigenous Peoples and the Environment, 31 VA.]. INT'L L. 479, 490 (1991). The 
indigenous peoples are interdependent on their environment and they farm the rainforest 
to survive. Id. at 494. The Huoarani once numbered between twenty and thirty thousand; it 
is estimated that there are only approximately 1500 alive today. CLIVE GRYLLIS, ENVIRON-
MENTAL HOOLIGANISM IN ECUADOR: A STUDY OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL 
EFFECTS OF OIL OPERATIONS IN THE ECUADORIAN ORIENTE 40 (1992). 
329 Genocide Convention, supra note 322, art. 2. 
330Id. 
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sovereign or the international community as a whole. 331 Recent U.S. 
cases indicate, however, that there will be no such conflict in the 
Aguinda case.332 Furthermore, the international community may 
encourage or perhaps require the assertion of jurisdiction in this 
case. 
l. Conflict with Laws in Ecuador 
One of the factors a court will weigh in a conflict of laws analysis 
is the degree of conflict between U.S. and foreign law.333 There does 
not seem to be any conflict between the laws of Ecuador and those 
domestic laws a U.S. court would apply to the Aguinda Complaint. 
The Ecuadoran Constitution guarantees the right to a clean envi-
ronment.334 Furthermore, there are many laws in Ecuador which 
address environmental issues and offer protection against environ-
mental degradation.335 Finding environmental liability would not, 
therefore, be in conflict with the laws of Ecuador. 
2. Foreign Relations 
There may, however, be a foreign relations issue if a court accepts 
jurisdiction. The Ecuadoran government was a partner in 
Petroecuador, the foreign corporation through which Texaco oper-
ated and which the Ecuadoran government still operates.336 The 
Ecuadoran government may be uncomfortable with a U.S. court 
ordering Texaco to pay damages or to engage in a cleanup in 
Ecuador because the court's order may impinge on Petroecuador's 
ability to continue operations without regard to the environment. 
Furthermore, Texaco has sued the government of Ecuador for 
contribution in Ecuadoran courts. 337 The Ecuadoran government is 
331 See supra text accompanying notes 130-156. 
332 See id.; see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 113 S. Ct. at 2921; Harvey, 2 F.3d at 1327. 
333 See Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 113 S.Ct. at 2910; Mannington Mills, Inc., 595 F.2d at 1297; 
Timberlane Lumber Co., 549 F.2d at 614. 
334 ECUADOR CON ST. art. 19 'l[ 2. The Constitution specifically establishes "the right to live 
in an environment free of contamination." Id. The constitution further states that "[i]t is the 
duty of the State to be vigilant so that this right should not be affected and to guard nature's 
preservation. Id. The law will establish the restrictions to exercise certain rights or liberties so 
as to protect the environment[.]" Id. 
335 Decree #374, supra note 9. The statute is very broad and covers the prevention and 
control of air pollution (Chapter V), water pollution (Chapter VI), and soil pollution (Chapter 
VlI).Id. 
336 See Indians Sue, supra note 11; see also Aguinda Complaint, supra note 8, at 4. 
337 Ecuador: Problems with Texaco Will Not Affect Oil Auction, Inter-Press Serv.,Jan. 17, 1994, 
available in LEXIS, World Library, Curnws file. In December 1993, Texaco filed a $300 million 
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likely to be against any exercise of jurisdiction which may adversely 
affect it.338 In fact, the government of Ecuador sent a communication 
to the U.S. government in December 1993 stating that Ecuador does 
not support the assertion of U.S. jurisdiction.339 This is not the 
unanimous position of the government, however, and there has 
been much criticism of the action. 340 
It is unlikely that foreign relations alone is sufficient to prevent 
the extraterritorial application of the ATCA in the Aguinda case. 
The Ninth Circuit, for example, does not examine foreign relations 
in a conflict oflaws analysis.341 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has 
recently stated that there is only one issue to analyze when a U.S. 
court determines whether to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction: Is 
there "a true conflict between domestic and foreign law?"342 
3. Enforceability of Judgment 
As previously discussed, a court must consider the enforceability 
of a judgment over the defendant. 343 If the court orders Texaco to 
clean up contaminated areas, enforcement would be difficult. If the 
court, however, orders a fund, either for restoration, medical moni-
toring, or both, there would be no enforcement problem. The funds 
would come from assets in the United States and could be set up 
and administered from the United States. 
This factor weighs heavily in favor of jurisdiction in the United 
States. The Ecuadoran courts could not enforce a judgment against 
the corporation because Texaco no longer has assets there. Further-
more, the fact that the plaintiffs in the Aguinda Complaint are 
unable to get relief in their own country weighs heavily in favor of 
entertaining the suit in the United States. 
lawsuit in Ecuador against the government. Id. The lawsuit alleges that the Ecuadoran 
petroleum authorities failed to comply with contractual obligations. Id. 
338 See Ecuador: Congress Accuses Duran-Ballen of Favoring Texaco, Inter Press Serv., Jan. 20, 
1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File. 
339Id. 
34°Id. 
341 See Timberlane Lumber Co., 549 F.2d at 614. 
342 Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 113 S.Ct. at 2910 (quoting Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospa-
tiale v. United States District Court, 482 U.S. 522, 555 (1987) (Blackmun,J., concurring in 
part, dissenting in part)). 
343 See Mannington Mills, Inc., 595 F.2d at 1298; Timberlane Lumber Co., 549 F.2d at 614. 
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4. The International Community 
The importance of the alleged violation in the United States 
versus its importance abroad may weigh in favor of declining juris-
diction.344 Environmental damages are a local problem, and the 
damages occurred in Ecuador. The United States, however, is con-
cerned with preventing its nationals from breaching international 
law. These actions may violate international law because conventions 
signed by the United States include a prohibition on such activi-
ties.345 
Courts do not like to make judgments which conflict with inter-
national law, but the court would not have to do so in the Aguinda 
case. The international community is concerned with the environ-
ment and is, therefore, unlikely to object to the United States assert-
ing control over its nationals to preserve and protect the environ-
ment. There are several indicia of this concern. 
In Our Common Future,346 for example, the World Commission on 
Environment and Development (Brundtland Commission) argued 
that if something is not done soon, humankind may entirely destroy 
the environment.347 Over the past twenty years, the international 
community had signed and ratified a number of conventions.348 The 
Brundtland Commission argued that this was not enough and for 
the first time spoke in terms of sustainable development. 349 In re-
sponse, world leaders began to discuss what this meant and began 
to formulate a unified and more holistic approach to environmental 
protection. This effort culminated in the United Nations Confer-
ence on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in June 
of 1992, where the international community signed several such 
conventions.350 
International law, therefore, reflects a heightened concern for the 
environment. Likewise, the international community is clearly con-
344 See Mannington Mills, Inc., 595 F.2d at 1297; Timberlane Lumber Co., 595 F.2d at 614. 
345 See supra notes 295-298 and accompanying text. 
346WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT & DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE (1987). 
The Secretary General of the United Nations approached Gro Harlem Brundtland of Norway 
in 1983 to formulate a global agenda for change. Id. at ix. The results of that commission 
were published in the book Our Common Future. 
347Id. 
348 See ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE, supra note 2, at 482-490. 
349 OUR COMMON FUTURE, supra note 346, at 43-65. 
350 See Edith Brown Weiss, Introductory Note to the United Nations Conference on Environment 
and Deveiopment, 311.L.M. 814, 814 (1992). 
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cerned with discovering new ways to address environmental issues 
that take into account the changing demands of a developing 
world. 351 Furthermore, "[n]o tenet of international law prohibits 
Congress from punishing the wrongful conduct of its citizens, even 
if some of that conduct occurs abroad. "352 
The court should assert extraterritorial jurisdiction in this case. 
Texaco is a U.S. citizen. The international community considers 
these types of activities wrongful. The court should recognize that 
the international community will not condemn, but, rather, will 
encourage the assertion of jurisdiction. Therefore, in a situation 
such as that alleged in the Aguinda Complaint, where a U.S. national 
is alleged to be responsible for environmental degradation overseas, 
a remedy should be found in U.S. courts. 
CONCLUSION 
The foreign plaintiffs in the Aguinda Complaint correctly chose 
not to include a cause of action under either RCRA, CERCLA, or 
the OPCLA, because such a claim would not succeed. Congress may 
have intended these statutes to apply extraterritorially in some cir-
cumstances. It is not likely, however, that they apply to wastes gen-
erated overseas and subsequently dumped there. 
There is a cause of action, however, under the ATCA. The first 
two criteria are clearly met: (1) this is a tort action, and (2) it is 
brought by an alien. The third criterion, that the actions violate the 
law of nations or a treaty, is also met. 
The court should find that the massive dumping and polluting 
activities violate the law of nations. The international community is 
concerned with the environment and has enacted various conven-
tions to address this issue. This suggests that environmental degra-
dation has become a violation of customary international law, as 
reflected in the numerous conventions recently signed and ratified 
by the international community. 
It is also possible that a concession agreement is a quasi-treaty 
under the ATCA. If the concession agreement included guarantees 
regarding the environment, the court might then find a cause of 
action under the ATCA. Any U.S. corporation that caused damage 
in violation of a concession agreement would violate a "treaty" under 
the ATCA, and a cause of action would lie. 
351 See discussion of the Rio Declaration, supra text accompanying notes 295-298. 
352 Harvey, 2 F.3d at 1329. 
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The actions also violate human rights and, therefore, violate 
either customary international law or jus cog ens. The severe environ-
mental degradation may result in ethnocide, which would violate 
either jus cog ens or customary international law. If there is sufficient 
evidence of human rights violations, the court will find that the 
alleged private actions of Texaco fall within the meaning of the law 
of nations under the ATCA. 
The exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction in this case will not 
violate international law. The international community would wel-
come the assertion of jurisdiction in this case. The international 
community would encourage the United States to hold its citizens 
to a high standard of environmental safety. The global community 
would welcome independent action against Texaco to ensure a safe 
and healthy environment for subsequent generations. 
The United States should hold its corporations to a uniform 
standard abroad because the international community is unable to 
agree to a unified solution to environmental problems. Developing 
countries, faced with unequal bargaining power, are often unable to 
ensure that their home environment will remain safe, regardless of 
domestic law to the contrary. The United States would aid these 
developing countries by ensuring that U.S. nationals will not inflict 
environmental damage, and that if such damage does occur, by 
requiring that it will be remediated. 
jennifer K Rankin 
